A POST – WAR CHALLENGE FOR SRI LANKA :

A POST – WAR CHALLENGE FOR SRI LANKA

DISMANTLING THE L.T.T.E. OVERSEAS
AND REBUILDING A SRI LANKAN IDENTITY
BY
PROFESSOR ROHAN GUNARATNA
Professor of Security Studies
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
Delivered on 2nd August 2010,
at the Auditorium of the Sri Lanka Foundation Institute
on the invitation of the Nandadasa Kodagoda Memorial Trust.
Chairperson of the Board of Trustee of the Nandadasa Kodagoda Memorial Trust Mrs. Ratna Kodagoda, Chairman of the Board of Management Professor Colvin Goonaratna, other office bearers of the Memorial Trust, family member of late Professor Kodagoda, distinguished invitees, ladies and gentleman,
It is my distinct privilege to deliver the 13th Desamanya Professor Nandadasa Kodagoda Oration this evening. Professor Kodagoda was an intellectual giant of our times. Born in Ahangama in the Galle District in 1929, he was educated at the Ahangama Village School, Nalanda Vidyalaya (till the onset of the 2nd World War) and at　Mahinda College, Galle.　He received his medical education at the Colombo Medical Faculty and became a doctor in 1954. He served in Galle and Karawanella for two years as a medical doctor and joined the Faculty of Medicine in Colombo in 1956 as a junior lecturer.　His postgraduate qualifications included a MD (Ceylon), DMJ, MRCP (UK) and FRCP (UK). He was Senior Lecturer in Forensic Medicine, Professor in Forensic Medicine, Head, Department of Forensic Medicine, Dean of the Colombo Medical Faculty for two terms and Vice Chancellor of the University of Colombo. Professor Kodagoda functioned as the Chairman of the National Dangerous Drugs Control Board for two terms and as the Acting Director of the Institute of Indigenous Medicine.　He was also the founder Chairman of the Alcohol & Drugs Information Centre (ADIC). Although Professor Kodagoda retired from university life in 1995, he remained active continuing his lifelong passion as a keen and an effective　mass communicator in public health issues using both the radio and the TV. He was awarded national honours, Kalaa Keerthi in 1986,　Deshamanya in 1992 and Vishwa Prasaadini in 1995. He was also awarded honorary Fellow of the National Academy of Science.
As a student at Ananda College in Colombo, I met with Professor Kodagoda. He inspired a generation of students like me by his prolific writings and talks. What touched me most was his deep interest in national and international issues, and the need for all of us to be educated formally and informally on such matters before they affect us. As such, I like to share my own views about a challenge facing Sri Lanka after the defeat of the LTTE.
　
　
The Context:
Sri Lanka defeated the world’s first insurgency of the 21st century. On May 19, 2009, the country achieved a great strategic and moral triumph by militarily defeating the LTTE. The theory that a political solution is a prelude to defeating an insurgency articulated by Western theorists and scholars was shattered. After three decades of fighting a cruel and costly insurgency, peace finally returned to Sri Lanka. Whether peace will endure and future prosperity will be achieved will depend on the ability and willingness of the political leaders of the country to work together across the party divide to build a new Sri Lanka.
The failure of Sri Lankan leaders to govern a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious society since independence precipitated Sri Lanka’s ethno-political conflict. Sri Lanka’s political masters compromised Sri Lanka’s long term national and strategic interests for short term political gain. Unless Sri Lankan politicians build the understanding to never again to play ethnic and religious based politics, poison the ground by radicalizing its youth, and reinforce ethnic and religious divisions, the country is likely to suffer a repetition of its unfortunate past.
Sri Lanka celebrated the end of the war but a segment of radicalized Sri Lankans both at home and overseas resent this victory. The terrorist threat to Sri Lanka has diminished but has not ended. The LTTE threat has declined in Sri Lanka, but it is on the incline overseas. The LTTE had two organizational bases – the domestic or the territorial base, from which it recruited, and, the foreign or the diaspora base, from which it generated the funds. To prevent a disconnect the LTTE exercised exceptional control over these two bases through intense and sustained propaganda and punishing dissent, at times brutally. After the LTTE was dismantled in the banks of the Nandikadal lagoon, the group very quickly reorganized itself overseas. Regarded once as the world’s most ruthless terrorist and guerrilla group, the LTTE after one year, is steadfastly re-emerging in Western cities. The LTTE is acting through three fronts – the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam led by Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran in New York, Global Tamil Forum led by Father S. J. Emmanuel in the U.K. and the criminal faction led by Perinbanayagam Sivaparan alias Nediyawan in Norway. The LTTE leaders, offices and assets overseas are largely intact. The LTTE-controlled diaspora campaign contributions and carefully orchestrated constituency pressure/electoral compulsions compel the U.S., U.K., Norway and a few countries to turn a blind eye to LTTE activities. Although the LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka has been decapitated, the LTTE’s global network poses an enduring and a long term threat to the stability and security of the country. The LTTE ideology is intact, its financial infrastructure is operational, and its vicious propaganda machine is impactful. For sustainable peace and stability, the long term ideological and the operational threat posed by the LTTE will need to be carefully managed.
To harness the hard earned gains of militarily defeating the LTTE, government must quickly develop a strategy of working towards engaging both the international community as well as the resident and non-resident Sri Lankan populations. Fourteen months have passed since May 2009, but we still need a concept, a master plan, or a national road map of crafting a future of prosperity for all Sri Lankans. While security is essential to setting the conditions for such success, a lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, broad-based political participation, and restored hope. The likely future trajectory of the LTTE will depend on the government’s ability to continue to work with the Tamil population, move fast and reach out to the Tamil diaspora and invest the time and resources to co-opt the Tamil political opposition both at home and abroad. The art of politics is not only to work with friends but also engage the opposition, the pockets of adversaries, and even past, present, and future enemies – this includes even those infected and still suffering from the Eelam ideology and seeking pathways to lead to a respectable mainstream life. To craft a road map to unify the country through nation building will de-legitimize and effectively invalidate the vicious ideology that spawned and sustained the violence that plagued Sri Lanka during 30 years. The government’s highly visible strategy of attrition of the past must be replaced by a high profile strategy of proactive engagement.
The New Political Landscape:
My presentation seeks to map contours of Sri Lanka’s new political landscape and what we must accomplish in a post-War phase to stabilize Sri Lanka with a short- to mid-term strategy. Today, every Sri Lankan must comprehend the new political reality and benefit from the peace dividend before us. The most dominant actors at play are the government, the international community and the remnants of the LTTE. The LTTE remnants seeking to reorganize include three components: (i) the LTTE group (dismantled), (ii) the LTTE network (active), and (iii) the LTTE movement (active). Let us examine each one of these components that took our country backwards by three decades.
　
The LTTE as a group:
The LTTE as a group is militarily vanquished. Although its ideology is intact, the component that was physically based in Sri Lanka is no longer operational as a coherent group. The conduct of the LTTE leadership in the final phase of battle demonstrated its true face of being willing to sacrifice its own support base and potential support base. Despite every Tamil family voluntarily or involuntarily providing a family member and resources, the Tamil public confidence the in the LTTE that was meticulously built through years of systematic indoctrination was shattered. Instead of respecting the fifth No Fire Zone (NFZ), the LTTE held nearly 280,000 Tamils as hostages. When the LTTE persisted and eventually started to shoot the civilians who wanted to flee, the Sri Lankan military was able to breach the LTTE human shield and launch an operation to rescue them. The angry Tamil civilians rescued by the Sri Lankan forces identified several thousand LTTE leaders, members and helpers. While over 10,000 LTTE cadres were killed, a total of 12,500 LTTE leaders, cadres and helpers who did not wish to fight either surrendered or were spotted by the Tamil civilians in the welfare centres. Although government was highly criticized for holding and screening the civilians, its strategy of preventing a re-infiltration and re-radicalization of the community was effective. Today, except a few thousand civilians who are free to leave the open welfare centres, every Tamil civilian have been resettled. Ironically, one part of the UN lobbied by the LTTE called and campaigned side by side with the LTTE fronts for early release of IDPs, while another part of the UN pressurized the government to delay the releases because of the slow pace of demining. Some leaders of international organizations, foreign governments, non-governmental organizations and a segment of the press exposed to LTTE’s powerful propaganda towed the LTTE line when they spoke of "concentration" and "internment" camps. This includes some poorly informed think tanks in Colombo that even propagated this view.
Despite the status of the economy of a country recovering from conflict, government even provided a resettlement allowance and continue to assist those IDPS. In recent history, no country has resettled such a significant number of the displaced in such a short period of time. Government appointed one of its ablest commanders Major General Kamal Gunaratna, the General Officer Commanding the 54 Division, as the Competent Authority of the IDPS, a task he admirably accomplished. Likewise government skilfully launched a multifaceted rehabilitation program under the guidance of the former Justice Minister Milinda Moragoda and Secretary of Defence Gotabhaya Rajapaksa to engage the LTTE followers. Away from the glare of the international media, government has today released all the disabled and student rehabilitees and has started the process of releasing the women rehabilitees. Unless there is a terrorist attack, government is likely to release over half of those undergoing rehabilitation within the next year. To prevent recidivism, it is paramount for government to continuously engage this vulnerable segment of our population. To ensure complete reintegration back to the community, there should be a separate authority to monitor their re-entry and maintain the engagement. Although the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation and his dedicated staff has treated the rehabilitees in the most humane way, the government has yet to get the re-entry piece into the community especially the long term monitoring part worked out. To prevent a relapse to the old ways, governments’ reintegration staff should work with the families, community and religious leaders, business and NGO communities. Extensive interagency collaboration is necessary to ensure that each one of the rehabilitees has a job and is never again trapped and once again misguided by the vicious and the intolerant ideology of the LTTE. The LTTE network overseas in partnership with a few Tamil political leaders at home seeks to re-poison another generation of Tamil youth.
If government is strategic in its thinking, the LTTE as group is unlikely to re-emerge in Sri Lanka in our life time. As long as government continues to re-orient its combat forces to developing the north and east and expand its intelligence strength, government will be capable to detect LTTE individual operatives and emerging support cells both at home and overseas especially in Tamil Nadu. In addition to focusing on economic growth and strengthening the partnership with Tamil parties, a powerful national and military intelligence service at home is the key to securing Sri Lanka in the coming years.
The LTTE Network Overseas:
The LTTE as a group has been rendered impotent at home. Nonetheless, the second component of the LTTE – its network overseas - has survived. The network’s activities that supported the terrorist campaign in Sri Lanka have moved to the diplomatic and international arena. They lobby not only governments but also the U.N., World Bank, IMF and other important stakeholders in international affairs. The network presents a short term (1-2 years) nuisance and an irritant and dependent on government response, a mid- to long-term threat (5-10 years). Although factionalized into three entities, these factions cooperate, at times, fight. To ensure compliance, the LTTE shadow leader Nediywan who heads the criminal network threatens and conducts acts of violence against other LTTE leaders and activists. The three factions are no longer genuinely interested in the welfare and well being of Tamils including those affected by the war. Their leaders, Nediyawan, Rudrakumaran and Emmanuel are interested in building their personal and political power and financial strength. As the activists and assets of the LTTE are located overseas, its network of front, cover and sympathetic organizations are not within the reach of the Sri Lankan law enforcement. Due to an inherent weakness of the Sri Lankan government’s overall strategy, in parallel with the security forces and the intelligence agencies that dismantled the LTTE in Sri Lanka, there was no similar fight overseas. Like the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of External Affairs must develop a vision and a mission that they too must play their role by making it their personal fight. The former foreign minister Lakhman Kadirgarmar, PC, a Tamil himself, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his tenure understood the threat from overseas and the need to counter it. Nonetheless, the working culture of Sri Lankan Foreign Service and other associated systemic factors of the service did not make it its single most important mission to dismantle the LTTE overseas.
Unfortunately in the run up to the final Wanni operation, most career foreign service officers appeared in the shadows without forcefully representing Sri Lanka’s interests and rebutting the LTTE and others influenced by its black and grey propaganda. There was no structure in place in the Ministry of External Affairs of appointing, promoting and rewarding based on merit, ability and performance in this domain. As such most career foreign service officers and political appointees did not adequately understand the importance of and hence did not embrace the responsibility of working closely with key international partners. To ensure that the LTTE presence is dismantled in the countries to which they are appointed, they must proactively identify and build adequate working relationships with the influential leaders in the political establishment, security and intelligence services, law enforcement authorities, human rights groups, think tanks, media and the Tamil community. To this date, when LTTE generates false report there is no established practice to monitor, counter and rebut the adverse publicity within six hours. As government neglected this crucial dimension, the LTTE network was able to convince some host governments and host communities of "ethnocide,""genocide," and "war crimes," activities that were not perpetrated by the government and labels that Sri Lanka never deserved. Furthermore, the LTTE interfaced, interlocked, and galvanized a segment of the Tamil population overseas and used them as pawns to wage their vicious and malicious propaganda campaign.
The configuration of the LTTE network overseas evolved dramatically even before its defeat at home. The successor to K.P., Manivannan Veerakulasingham alias Castro, headed LTTE’s international network since 2003. Raising funds under the pretext of relief and rehabilitation, the LTTE invested the bulk of its finances in arms procurement from North Korea and propaganda in the West. Although the bulk of the LTTE ships have been destroyed, its propaganda network is still intact. Dismantling the LTTE infrastructure and countering the false propaganda can be accomplished by two principal methods.
First, government should create platforms and institutions in northern and eastern Sri Lanka to engage LTTE leaders and their activists overseas. Ideally working with the parliamentary opposition, government should build a mechanism, to invite these misguided LTTE leaders to witness for themselves the unprecedented economic development in the north and east, the humane treatment of the displaced and the rehabilitees, and create opportunities for their participation. Ironically, most Tamils including those who contributed to the LTTE and protested in Western capitals are tired and they want to visit their loved ones or return home to invest. In the larger interest of peace and national reconciliation, the President should grant an amnesty to those who engaged in not so serious criminal activity in support of the LTTE. Government should build a mechanism through its missions abroad to ensure that their travel is facilitated and they are engaged in a manner to facilitate others to re-enter the Sri Lankan mainstream. Sri Lankan political opposition should declare its support to the government for such a mechanism including to engage with Rudrakumaran, Father Emmanuel and Nediyawan. If they or other high ranking figures of the LTTE’s international network remains stubbornly uncooperative notwithstanding sincere attempts by the government, should be totally left out of the political discourse and thereafter exposed to the law enforcement authorities of their countries of domicile to be dealt with for their criminal activities.
Second, government should expand the mandate of its national and military intelligence services to operate overseas both to develop its coverage of terrorist support and operational activities. While the dominant strategy should be to engage, it is native for Sri Lankans to think that LTTE network aboard will not plan and prepare acts of terrorism overseas for striking in Sri Lanka. Although most Tamils including those radicalized see the sense of pursuing non violence to achieve their goals, there are a few fanatics with the mindset within the three factions determined to resort to violence. Already, LTTE cells in India and Malaysia that supported acts of terrorism in Sri Lanka have been detected. As an LTTE hardcore is active overseas, they need to be closely monitored and appropriate actions taken. There should be dedicated desks to every country and not every region where there is LTTE personnel, infrastructure and activities. Such desks should work closely with the diplomatic, political, intelligence, law enforcement - police, border control, and others - judicial and other branches of government. After 9-11, if there is a will, there are sufficient political commitment and mechanisms available globally to bring to justice anyone who is seeking to spawn, support and sustain terrorism.
Sri Lanka was fortunate that by 2005, virtually all countries in the developed West and Europe had proscribed the LTTE. We will be failing in our duty, if we fail to recall with gratitude the untiring efforts of the late Minister Kadirgarmar with regard to successfully satisfying foreign leaders that the LTTE was no mere 'liberation or freedom organization', by a 'criminal terrorist outfit'. It is the international proscription on the LTTE, which made it difficult for any foreign government to directly criticize the Government of Sri Lanka for its resolve to militarily demolish the LTTE.　If we are serious in our current determination to continue to take all meaningful measures to eliminate the LTTE's remaining tentacles located overseas, it is of paramount importance that Sri Lanka ensures that countries which have proscribed the LTTE continues to have on board the proscription, and countries such as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa proscribes the LTTE. It is vital that diplomatic measures aimed at achieving this objective, should be implemented following a comprehensive understanding of the divergent mechanisms in place in such countries.　In certain countries the authority to designate an organization as an 'International Terrorist Organization' or as a 'Terrorist Organization' (and thereby proscribe it), rests with the Executive i.e. the Head of State, Minister of Defence or some other official of the executive. In certain other countries, the designation of an organization and thereby proscribe it should be done through legislative action i.e. by passing a law. In certain other countries, there is a need for both the central government and the federal government and their respective Parliaments to collaborate in this regard. Australia is one such example. This means that, proscription or designation, is basically a political decision taken in the backdrop of factual circumstances such as the conduct of the organization.　Under these circumstances, if we are to ensure that the LTTE remains proscribed and countries such as Australia which has not yet proscribed the LTTE proscribes it, Sri Lanka has to necessarily have a positive diplomatic and political relationship with such countries. Furthermore, apart from continuing to brief those governments regarding continuing activism (aimed at re-activating terrorist operations) by LTTE organizational manifestations in those countries, Sri Lanka needs to have a better ground situation. This means that the government should in good faith necessarily address the genuine political needs of the Tamil minority. Foreign leaders should necessarily perceive that the Government of Sri Lanka is acting reasonably and will effectively protect the interests of Tamil people, in the aftermath of a full elimination of the LTTE.
Now that an armed conflict does not exist, the only legally tenable way in which LTTE activists could be neutralized and thereby prevented from continuing to engage in LTTE activities, is by successfully prosecuting them for their terrorist and other criminal activities. Sri Lankan authorities have been somewhat successful in that regard, by launching successful prosecutions against LTTE hardcore activists in Sri Lankan courts and thereby getting them imprisoned to serve terms of imprisonment, and by promoting investigations and prosecutions against LTTE activists who operated on foreign soil. Both due to keen interest shown by local authorities and due to initiatives of foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies, successful prosecutions have been launched against LTTE activists in Canada, United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Italy, India, and Australia. If LTTE activists are to be kept at bay and dissuaded from engaging in LTTE activities on foreign soil, these investigations and prosecutions have to necessarily continue. However, now that LTTE activists operating in developed countries appears to have satisfied foreign powers that they are no longer engaging in terrorist or otherwise illegal activities on foreign soil and that their activities are limited to lobbying and political activism, the challenge for Sri Lanka would become considerably difficult. Though we as Sri Lankans will steadfastly argue that a Tiger never changes his stripes and hence LTTE activists would use political activism only to　camouflage their determined efforts aimed at reviving the LTTE as a violent force, it is likely that foreign powers would prefer to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude and not continue to arrest LTTE activists, particularly since LTTE activists no longer pose a threat to the normal law and order in countries in which they presently operate. Therefore, Sri Lankan authorities would necessarily have to turn towards the Sri Lankan criminal justice system, to have LTTE operatives investigated, arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned. One major barrier in this regard, appears to be that Sri Lankan courts do not have extra-territorial jurisdiction, to try persons such as LTTE operatives who have committed offences overseas, and not engaged in any illegal activities on Sri Lankan soil. It would be important for Sri Lankan authorities to pay due regard to this weakness of the Sri Lankan criminal justice system and adopt legislative reform so as to vest extra-territorial jurisdiction in Sri Lankan criminal courts and to amend the substantive criminal law of Sri Lanka to recognize as punishable offences LTTE activism overseas.　
Radicalized Segments of the Diaspora:
A million Sri Lankan Tamils live overseas but only those exposed to LTTE propaganda voluntarily supported LTTE’s violent agenda. Although not all of them suffered from the war and was traumatized, the developments at home affected the entire diaspora to different degrees. Except for the pre-1983 migrants, it is very likely that a considerable percentage of the diaspora had lost a loved one or suffered humiliation – the subject of a cordon and search operation, a mistaken arrest, a rude remark by a member of another community. In war, everyone suffers - even those who flee the war zone. Not every family can leave the affected areas – nonetheless, many left behind their loved ones. What happens at home is reflected overseas. Additionally, the LTTE exploited the incidents of violence and magnified it for propaganda value.
The aim of the LTTE was to generate support, to different degrees. The LTTE indoctrinated segments of overseas Tamils both for lobbying and campaigning against the Sri Lanka government but also to raise funds. The LTTE funded its military campaign in Sri Lanka and political campaign overseas with funds raised and military goods procured from abroad. The bulk of LTTE’s budget was diaspora contributions both voluntary and forced. Although most did not contribute voluntarily, due to LTTE’s implicit coercion an appreciable segment of the diaspora contributed to the LTTE financially. The radicalized segment of the diaspora needed a return for their investment – that was Tamil Eelam, the imaginary state Prabhakaran created in their minds. The most indoctrinated believed that the LTTE was indestructible and Prabhakaran was invincible. They prayed for him, his portrait adorned the walls of their homes, and paraded his image even in countries the LTTE was blacklisted. Even a narrow segment of the diaspora saw Prabhakaran as God and Tamil’s savoir. Upon his death, they mourned. Their grief turned into suffering, anger, and resentment. To recoup that deep sense of loss, the LTTE created on paper a transnational government. Those who needed to fight back have joined this hollow idea which even the LTTE theoreticians know is not a recognized concept in public international law and pragmatic international affairs. It is only a political platform for overseas LTTE activists to retain their respective identities and to continue to harness the resources of the Tamil diaspora by blinding them in the belief that following the utter failure in waging a war, a transnational government in exile is a pathway to a state of Tamil Eelam. Only 10% of the diaspora voted for the Transnational government ideal. Those who were vulnerable to high degrees of indoctrination emerged as the most committed. Amidst this community of the indoctrinated, the tiny hardcore that specifically funded the fight – meaning, insisted that their contribution is to mount attacks, present a threat today. Until a terrorist attack is carried out in Sri Lanka, they feel deeply unhappy. The hardcore need the LTTE to be reconstituted and witness Sri Lanka’s return to violence. Nonetheless, this hardcore group is unrepresentative of the spirit of the larger diaspora that want to do something good for their brethren and positive for their land of birth and heritage. They too had suffered from the LTTE and the war, like most other Sri Lankans.
The best strategy to de-Eelamize the Tamils influenced and indoctrinated requires an effective strategy to dismantle the ideology that spawned and sustained the violence that plagued Sri Lanka during 30 years of conflict. Until then, the Tamils exposed to LTTE propaganda will be conceptually uncomfortable even with the idea of a united Sri Lanka. Thus to rebuild a Sri Lankan identity it is essential to engage the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora communities. As the diaspora is not monolithic, the Sri Lankan governments’ response to the diaspora challenge should be multipronged.
First, the best antidote for an active diaspora is to facilitate and encourage service to community and country. Whether galvanized by war or energized by LTTE propaganda, the government should eventually create a separate Diaspora Department headed by a top civil servant to encourage and facilitate the return and assist in the resettlement of Tamils and to help them to contribute towards economic and social development of their own brethren. The bulk of the diaspora waited for this moment either to focus their energy and resources towards Sri Lanka or to return to their motherland. The government should make use of this opportunity to facilitate the innate desire of every diasporan to invest in the people or the infrastructure in the north and east. To engage the larger Tamil diaspora communities in 15 countries, the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka should create points of contact for the diaspora at Sri Lankan missions or tourism offices overseas to channel that investment to AGA divisions in the north and east. Following the Afghan model, the diaspora as well as the host country should build a development partnership with a conflict affected AGA division. In addition to challenging the LTTE fund raising, such a positive engagement will help channel resources in a constructive manner. Working with NGOs and with the private sector, government can maximize the opportunities. To prompt diversion of resource in such a direction, the Sri Lankan government should create such mechanisms and the President himself should continue to request Sri Lankans and those of Sri Lankan heritage living overseas to return and unite. It is important to remember that one of the greatest resources Sri Lanka has is its human resources, a significant portion of it presently lives outside the country.
Second, the government should also engage the radicalized segment of the diaspora and not permit them to live in that state of continuous ignorance. Government needs to create platforms for engaging them through diaspora meetings both at home and overseas. The government convened the first such meeting for nine Tamil diaspora leaders in May 2010. The meeting provided both the government an assessment of the extent of LTTE indoctrination and in return the diaspora leaders realized the humane approach government had adopted in resettling the displaced and rehabilitating the LTTE leaders and cadres in custody. Furthermore, these leaders visited the north and east and saw for themselves the unprecedented development as well as the cordial relationship between the government including the military and the civilian population. The Minister of External Affairs G.L. Peiris and the Secretary Defence Gotabhaya Rajapaksa assured them that the war had ended and everyone must work towards a common identity as Sri Lankans. The diaspora leaders underwent a cognitive and emotional shift after they spoke to the doctors and the displaced who were rescued from the last No Fire Zone and the LTTE detainees. Many of them realized rather than be informed that the cycle of violence that destroyed the north and east was reinforced by their contributions. By continuing the engagement of meetings and visits and facilitating security and opportunities of diaspora leaders, the radicalized segment of the diaspora can be guided. The same leaders that influenced the diaspora to imagine that there was genocide, has the best chance of correcting this misperception. If properly guided by a leader with the correct understanding, that sense of wrong, guilt or shame is sufficient to create a spark to devote the rest of their life to serve those who suffered in the north and east.
The engagement with the diaspora leaders also helped the government to better understand the diaspora needs. Government realized the need to create an information centre to provide sound and timely information for the diaspora. The LTTE exploited the absence of such information. To counter LTTE misinformation, the best government strategy is to maintain a public database especially about the IDPS, detainees, and rehabilitees.
Of the two principal approaches that can be used by the government to accomplish this feat, both engagement and enforcement is necessary. Especially in a post war context, engagement of Tamils at home and overseas should be the preferred tool. The battle to win hearts and minds cannot be fought with guns, tanks, ships and aircraft. Engagement leads to genuine transformation but enforcement only to strategic calculation. Genuine departure from abandoning an ideology comes not from repression and fear but understanding and facilitation. That is creating attractive pathways so irresistible where an individual exits and transforms from one ideology to another. A bad idea can only be replaced with a better idea. Such strategies to reducing the costs of leaving can be created by creative leaders in government and government working in partnership with the private sector. Although to fight terrorism enforcement is the best strategy, engagement is the best strategy to dissuade support for terrorism. Such a strategy is beginning to work. Rajan, the former LTTE leader in Malaysia revealed: "During my father’s time we fought politically, my generation fought militarily, at least the generation of my children and grandchildren must campaign peacefully. That is our hope." To disband LTTE’s highly destructive ideology, the government must create platforms for former militant leaders who repent such as K.P. to articulate their points of view publicly. Certainly some of those holding extreme views regarding the conflict on both sides of the divide, neither understand nor endorse such a strategy. To prevent the political opposition from attacking the idea, the government should adopt a bipartisan approach when taking the process forward. Otherwise, as the Sri Lankan culture of confrontational politics dictates, the political opposition may not support it. Ideally, on matters of foreign policy and national security bipartisanship should prevail.
　
A Paradigm Shift:
To build permanent peace in Sri Lanka, there must be a change in ideality and reality. That is creating the institutions to change the reality on the ground and to counter possible root causes for development of a political motive to move towards separation. This can be only achieved by a sincere appreciation by all regarding the multiple pluralities of our diverse society and by recognizing and enforcing absolute equality. Not only should there not be discrimination, there should not even be the opportunity to give rise to a perception of possible discrimination. To achieve this goal, there has to be indeed a degree of attitudinal change in all Sri Lankans. Respect to the other and tolerance should be the cornerstones of our routine behaviour. Recognition and protection of human rights, democracy, mechanisms to ensure good governance and optimal devolution of executive and legislative functions of government within the framework of a single sovereign Sri Lanka, should necessarily be the basic principles of the new Constitution of Sri Lanka. This in my view, is the pathway for the establishment of sustained peace, and the realization of a truly Sri Lankan identity wherein no person of this blessed nation would ever want to move towards separation all over again. It is through such change that we can achieve sustainable peace, and move towards national unity and prosperity of our beloved country.
I thank you.